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   Are Agricultural PACs Monolithic? An Empirical Investigation  
 
 
Abstract:  This paper analyzes donation strategies of agricultural PACs by 
examining and testing a variety of variables theoretically related to contributions 
and formally testing for equivalence of donation strategies across PACs of 
varying levels of aggregation. Both chambers of the 108
th Congress were 
modeled, with particular attention paid to the targeting of different power or 
influence sources within the legislature. Results showed significant heterogeneity 
across PAC subaggregates within a chamber, as well as between chambers, in 
terms of overall strategy and magnitude of marginal impacts. Evidence supporting 
the conditional party government hypothesis where PACs target top Party 
officials rather than influential legislative members was mixed and subindustry 
specific, with chairmanships apparently less important in the Senate than in the 
House. 
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  There is a wealth of literature supporting the notion that politicians provide political 
favors in return for financial contributions (Ansolabehere, Snyder and Tripathi; Becker).   
Ironically, individuals frequently must band together to gain enough scale to be effective, but the 
aggregation competes with their own self interests.  Agricultural Political Action Committees 
(PACs), for example, enable people to concentrate donations under a large community banner 
like “agriculture,” livestock,” or “cotton” (van Doren, Hoag and Field; Taylo).  Thomas 
Jefferson romanticized the “Agrarian Ideology” that binds people to an agricultural community 
over 200 years ago and it still holds today, as written by essayists like Wendell Berry (Browne 
et. al; Hamlin and Shepard).  However, at the same time there are disparate interests among 
agriculture’s many constituents.  Cattle and poultry producers, for example, may not prefer 
programs that prop up corn prices, and ethanol producers might support sugar embargos.  To be 
sure, there is a community ethic applied to agricultural values.  But which outweighs the other:  
one’s parochial interests or their interest in the broader agricultural community? To formally test 
the hypothesis of homogeneity between various agricultural interests, this paper investigates the 
patterns of agricultural PAC contributions to members of the House and Senate for the 108
th 
Congress, and formally tests for differences in the marginal impacts of alternative legislator 
attributes on donations across different PAC categories in agriculture.   
  Although there is strong evidence that PACs will allocate their contributions to buy 
access to politicians (Ansolabehere, Snyder and Tripathi), there is little evidence about whether 
agricultural PACs cooperate to buy the same things.   On one hand, the nature of a PAC is to 
  1advocate a partisan interest, and the interests in agriculture can be diverse.  “The Making of the 
1996 Farm Act,” for example, described several instances where interests conflicted (Schertz and 
Doering).  Commodity programs competed with each other, as well as food programs, for budget 
allocations, and how cotton and rice interests were reluctant at first to agree to the Freedom To 
Farm legislation.  Over the past few decades, livestock producers mounted little resistance to 
programs that boosted crop prices, even though they would have to pay more for feed and 
receive very little Federal support relative to crop producers.   
  All of the PAC studies we could find looked at how PAC’s pursued rent seeking.      
Using data from the 108
th Congress, we revisit a study from ten years earlier by van Doren, Hoag 
and Field. They looked at agricultural PAC contributions in the Senate, but did not investigate 
whether contributions were monolithic (devoted to community over self interest).   There are 
several reasons to believe that agricultural PAC’s parochial interests might be limited by group 
values and beliefs.  Experience has shown that cooperation has characterized country values 
(Castle).   People often refer to agriculture as a whole and the Agrarian Ideology reconciles 
community values and self-interest as one in the same (Browne, et. al).   Furthermore, Gardner  
and Pasour and Rucker showed that groups form coalitions to seek rents, especially in the case of 
agriculture where new interests, such as environmentalists, are growing.  Hamlin and Shepard 
suggest that agricultural groups see the world as an “us (agriculture) versus them (everybody 
else)”.  Finally, the Agrarian Ideology may persist because non-producers have little knowledge 
about agriculture, and those in agriculture have an incentive to promote a romantic image.   
  As a means of investigating the revealed behavior of PAC actions that incorporates both 
the Agrarian Ideology and partisan interests, we examine both the House and Senate for 
differences in the structural equations that explain donations for several subsectors of agriculture. 
  2Our analysis unveils overall agricultural PAC strategies, as well as differences between 
subaggregates.  This information, plus our ability to compare to the earlier study when the Senate 
was controlled by Democrats, also allows us to determine the homogeneity of agricultural PAC 
donation strategies and to discuss what their behavior implies monolithic donation behavior.   
Cooperation at the cost of partisan interests is a new dimension in public choice literatture and 
offers a chance to investigate how group cooperation can produce or reduce rents for both the 
participants and society (Pasour and Rucker).   Therefore, we proceed by looking at the tension 
between cross-compliance expectations with an agricultural community and self interests. 
Determining PAC Contribution Strategies 
  Public choice theory suggests that PACs and legislators are participants in a market for 
political favors, where the former use campaign contributions and other favors to purchase 
services (such as specific legislation or votes for that legislation, access to House or Senate 
members, or effort from elected individuals) supplied by the latter (Becker; Mitchell and 
Munger; van Doren, Hoag, and Field; Stratmann). Unlike typical market transactions, however, 
the quantity of these services is often either unobservable or measured with a significant degree 
of error, rendering traditional estimation of supply and demand untenable (van Doren, Hoag, and 
Field). An alternative strategy employed in both the political science and economics literature is 
to estimate a reduced-form equation that describes either equilibrium price (i.e., contributions 
from PACs), the probability of a transaction, or both as a function of exogenous legislator 
characteristics that shift supply or demand (van Doren, Hoag, and Field; Poole, Romer, and 
Rosenthal; Grenzke; Taylor). 
  Past research suggests that, in general, PACs target contributions in different ways to get 
their desired policy outcomes. In general, contributions depend on the following legislator 
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chairs), influence (which targets seniority and committee members), political ideology or policy 
stance (conservative/liberal voting record and political party), constituency interests in 
agriculture, and the tightness of an election race (Grenzke; Poole, Romer, and Rosenthal; van 
Doren, Hoag, and Field).  
One line of recent literature has focused on the source of power due to the casual 
observation that voting preferences within political parties have been increasingly homogenized, 
and thus the source of power, primarily in terms of veto power, comes from party leadership, 
rather than committee leadership (Taylor). Taylor combined this “conditional party government” 
hypothesis with the idea that inter-industry PACs may be heterogeneous in terms of donation 
strategies and/or targeted attributes (see, for e.g., Grenzke; van Doren, Hoag, and Field; Grier 
and Munger, 1991; Gopian).  He concluded that, depending on the salience of the issues faced by 
PACs, each may target alternative types of legislators.  That is, PAC’s now must compare the 
party power with each legislator’s power when targeting their donations. 
  The model that follows builds on this literature by examining the House and Senate 
member attributes that attract PAC contributions within one industry, namely agricultural PACs 
for the Republican-majority 108
th Congress. Furthermore, we test for differences across 
subgroup strategies in order to determine if their donation behavior is monolithic. This paper 
updates and extends the analysis in van Doren, Hoag and Field, who examined agricultural PAC 
donations for the Senate of the Democratic-majority103
rd Congress.     
Data and Methods 
Two Tobit models are employed in the analysis for each chamber of the 108
th Congress. 
The first uses aggregate PAC donations by subgroups (defined by industry codes) as the 
  4dependent variable, and is used in a standard way to determine the marginal effects of several 
relevant power and influence explanatory variables, thus providing evidence both in favor of and 
against the conditional party hypothesis, and between these two categories of contribution 
determinants. The second model normalizes this variable by dividing by mean subgroup 
donations, and thus creates a dependent variable of the proportion of the mean contribution for 
each subgroup, while retaining the property of truncation at zero. Unlike the standard model, the 
resultant coefficients in this model are normalized as well, and can thus be used to test for 
monolithic behavior between PAC subgroups. 
  The dependent variables were created from data obtained from the Center for Responsive 
Politics (CRP) in Washington, D.C. on total agricultural PAC subgroup donations for each 
legislator serving in the 108
th Congress. Data for each House member includes all agricultural 
PAC donations made during the 2004 election cycle, while data for the Senate includes 
aggregate donations for the 2000, 2002, and 2004 to account for the staggered election cycle 
(van Doren, Hoag, and Field). The 29 agricultural PAC subgroups were defined by CRP based 
on industry classifications, with the taxonomy described by 9 aggregates further broken into sub-
aggregates, as described in table 1. The 9 subgroups are Ag Services/Products, Crop Production 
and Basic Processing, Dairy, Food Processing and Sales, Forestry and Forest Products, 
Livestock, Miscellaneous Agriculture, Poultry and Eggs, and Tobacco and Tobacco Products.  
One of these major subgroups, Miscellaneous Agriculture, only contained a small number of 
non-zero observations, and was thus dropped from the analysis.  Total agriculture represents the 
aggregation of all 29 subgroups. 
Guided by the literature cited above, we use several independent variables to control for 
party affiliation, ideology, power (including leadership by chamber and on key committees), 
  5influence (including seniority and committee membership), constituency, and election margin. 
Party affiliation is coded as a binary variable with zero corresponding to Democratic legislators 
(and the one independent, Vermont Senator Jeffords). Ideology was proxied by an indicator 
variable that represents approval of the American Farm Bureau Federation (AFBF),based on how 
consistent a legislator’s votes were with that organization’s goals.
1 Additional rating variables 
from various conservative political organizations (e.g., the American Conservative Union 
(ACU), John Birch Society, Christian Coalition, etc…) were found to be highly correlated with 
party affiliation and with each other (correlation coefficients greater than .9, not shown).  
Likewise, liberal indexes (e.g. NARAL, Democrats for Life of America) were highly negatively 
correlated with the AFBF index.   As such, they were not included as additional linear effects in 
the models, as inclusion would induce serious multicollinearity and add very little explanatory 
power to the model. Instead, a new ideology variable was created by calculating the distance 
between each legislator’s ACU rating and the party mean ACU rating. This variable was 
normalized such that the mean score for each party was 100, with positive deviations indicating a 
more conservative legislator (as defined by ACU). We thus capture the effects of deviation from 
the party norm on agricultural PAC donations, and allow non-linearities through a quadratic 
term. 
  Power is defined as in Taylor, and includes Speaker, majority and minority leaders, 
whips, caucus/conference chairs, and campaign committee chairs in the House of 
Representatives, and majority and minority leaders, President and President Pro-Tempore, whips, 
conference chairman/secretary, and campaign committee chairs for the Senate. Influence was 
captured in the model through the use of indicator variables that denote membership on relevant 
agriculture-related committees and length of tenure in office, which may affect ability of the 
  6legislator to influence his/her peers.  This variable is introduced with a quadratic term to allow 
for non-constant marginal effects. Two standing (sub)committees for each chamber expected to 
influence legislation related to agriculture are included: Agriculture and the Appropriations 
Subcommittee on Agriculture for the House, and Agriculture, Nutrition, and Forestry and the 
Appropriations Subcommittee on Agriculture, Rural Development, Food and Drug 
Administration, and Related Agencies for the Senate. To capture potential non-linear marginal 
effects of committee membership due to seniority, the committee indicator variables were 
interacted with the number of years in office. Although these interaction variables introduce 
multicollinearity into the analysis, we found that the model fit was improved, and thus the 
variables were retained. 
  The remaining independent variables include the margin of victory in the last election 
cycle to control for the impacts of the contention of the race (van Doren, Hoag, and Field; 
Taylor), the percentage of employment in Agriculture, Forestry, Fishing and Hunting, and 
Mining by state or congressional district (from the 2000 U.S. Census), and dummy variables in 
the Senate models that indicate election cycle. An interaction term between Agricultural 
Committee membership and seniority was included as an additional explanatory variable 
describing power and influence with regard to agricultural legislation. Summary statistics for the 
variables used in the analysis are presented in table 2. Estimation was performed using Stata 7.0. 
Base Tobit Model Results 
Senate 
Results of the non-normalized Senate Tobit models for each major subaggregate, 
including the parent model that includes all agricultural PAC donations, are presented in table 3. 
Zero coefficient restrictions have been imposed where appropriate above the 15% level, based on 
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makes it easier to focus on which variables have an impact and which do not, because both are 
left in the table of results.  The restricted and unrestricted models yield equally valid estimates 
and very small differences in significant coefficient estimates.  As neither of the two dummy 
year election variables were significant in any model, they are excluded from the table. Slope 
coefficients for each model are jointly significant at the 1% level, with signs that are generally as 
expected. Two exceptions are the negative and significant effect of a committee or subcommittee 
chairmanship on donations from the Crop Production subgroup and the negative and significant 
effect of state agricultural employment on contributions from Poultry and Eggs. The former 
appears to be a result of Crop Production targeting members of the minority Democrats (who do 
not hold chairs) in addition to majority leaders, while the latter may be explained by the 
concentrated nature of the Poultry and Egg industry. 
 The Total Ag PAC regression (column 2 of table 3) shows that when taken in aggregate, 
agricultural PACs generally favor contributing to Republican members of the Senate who gain 
the approval of the AFBF. While the latter result is unsurprising, the former stands in stark 
contrast to the findings of Van Doren, Hoag, and Field, who found that Democrats are more 
likely to receive contributions. The earlier result applied to the 103
rd Congress in which 
Democrats were the majority party, suggesting that party allegiance is a less important attribute 
than legislative control for describing agricultural contribution decisions. Additional evidence 
supporting this hypothesis is the positive and significant relationship between donations and 
many of the power and influence explanatory variables, including being a member of the 
majority leadership, membership on the agriculture or agriculture appropriations 
(sub)committees, and the interaction term between tenure and committee membership. 
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margin, and ideology deviations from the party mean were insignificant. Taken together, this 
suggests that agricultural PACs tend to follow a strategy that specifically targets legislators on 
(sub)committees with influence over important legislation, but do not ignore the importance of 
power in terms of overall party majorities and more specifically, majority leadership. The 
insignificance of chairmanships further supports the notion of the conditional party hypothesis, 
and implies that power and influence interact to drive agricultural campaign donations to the 
Senate. 
The decomposition of the regressions into PAC subaggregates (columns 3-10) reveals 
differences in how power and influence is targeted across agricultural donors. For example, of 
the 8 subgroups, only 1 was found to specifically target the majority leadership at the 5% level of 
significance (although three more are identified at 10%), and three focused on tight races, as 
shown by the negative and significant (at 5%) sign on the margin variable. In addition, 
deviations from party ideology in the conservative direction tended to increase contributions 
from the Livestock, Poultry and Eggs, and Tobacco sectors, with the latter two also targeting 
majority leadership rather than chairs. In fact, the chair power variables were not positive and 
significant for any subaggregate. These results support the conditional party hypothesis of 
targeting majority leadership rather than (sub)committee leadership, especially if one interprets 
contributions to close electoral races as indicative of a desire to maintain majority control of the 
Senate.  
Influence through committee membership was significant for 7 of 8 PAC subgroups, with 
the exception being the Tobacco industry. Of these, all positively targeted the agriculture 
committee, and 6 contributed more to the appropriations subcommittee. Interestingly, the five 
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group of committee members, but Tobacco was the only PAC that conditionally contributed 
more to majority leadership but not to committee members. Thus, it appears that the subgroups 
in the sample tend to follow either a singular strategy of either contributing more to influential 
committee members, or pursuing a mixed strategy targeting majority power and influence. 
Chairmanships in the Senate do not appear to attract significantly more financial contributions. 
Even so, there appears to be considerable heterogeneity in contribution strategies for agricultural 
PACs in the Senate, which will be more formally tested in a later section. 
House of Representatives 
Table 4 presents a similar table of the non-normalized Tobit regressions for the 108
th 
House of Representatives. Like the Senate results, Republicans generated more campaign 
contributions from agricultural PACs overall (as indicated by the positive and significant 
coefficient on Party), but approval of the AFBF was not a significant variable in this regression. 
There continues to be evidence that power and influence are key explanatory components of 
contribution strategies for this chamber as well, with positive and significant coefficients on the 
majority leadership interaction variable, certain committee variables, and unlike the Senate, 
(sub)committee chair indicators. As in the Senate, however, electoral margin and constituency 
variables were insignificant for aggregate contributions. 
In addition to the targeting of (sub)committee chairs, the significance of office tenure and 
deviations from party ideology for the House is a distinguishing feature from Senate. Seniority 
alone was found to have a nonlinear relationship with aggregate agricultural PAC contributions, 
with an initially negative impact that becomes less negative with tenure, eventually turning 
positive after about 18 years (about the 83
rd percentile in the sample). This is similar to the 
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House members and senior statespersons were more likely to receive large contributions in the 
2004 election. Also in contrast to our Senate results, deviation from a party’s mean ideology 
positions are a significant explanatory factor, entering via a quadratic function that suggests 
relatively extreme positions are rewarded relative to mean party beliefs. The turning point of the 
function, however, is at an ideology score of approximately 67, corresponding to the 2
nd 
percentile of the sample (i.e., 98% of the observations had scores greater than 67). Thus, for the 
majority of observations, a more conservative position results in greater PAC donations.  
In the House, 6 of 8 of the subaggregates target majority leadership and 5 of 8 target 
members of the majority party  (at the 5% level of significance) regardless of their power. Only 
the Crop Production and Basic Processing sector targets neither, opting instead to contribute to 
senior members and chairs of the relevant (sub)committees. This stands in contrast to this 
subgroup’s contribution behavior in the Senate, in which majority leadership is a significant 
explanatory variable, suggesting that there may be heterogeneity in strategy across chambers for 
one subgroup as well as across subgroups. In a similar vein, 7 of 8 subaggregates contribute 
more to (sub)committee chairs, perhaps recognizing their power to influence legislation coming 
before the broader House and in contrast to the conditional party hypothesis. Thus, the evidence 
suggests that for agricultural PACs, party leadership is relatively more important in the Senate 
than in the House, where committee leadership is more valuable from the standpoint of 
legislators. Stated slightly differently, both power and influence are generally targeted in the 
House, and donation strategies do not tend to target one source of power, but rather diversify 
across both majority leadership and (sub)committee chairs. 
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power of district agricultural employment, positive and significant in 3 of the 8 cases in the 
House at the 5% level versus only the Livestock sector for the Senate.  Seniority is penalized at a 
decreasing rate for Congresspersons in 5 of the 8 cases (with turning points between 15 and 19 
years, again at 5%), and that conservative ideologues in either party tend to be rewarded in 6 of 8 
cases. However, this result manifests itself non-linearly (i.e., through the positive squared term) 
for the Ag Services/Products and Tobacco sectors, while the effect is linear for Dairy, Food 
Processing and Sales, and Forestry and Forest Products. In other words, the marginal effect of 
deviation from party ideology in the conservative direction is estimated to be constant and 
positive for these latter sectors, while the marginal effect becomes less negative with the former. 
In addition, the Livestock PACs are the only organizations to continue to contribute more to 
legislators in tight races (though there is limited evidence that the Tobacco industry targets 
landslide candidates). 
We now turn to formal testing of the equivalence of agricultural PAC donation strategies 
across subaggregates.  
Testing the Hypothesis of Monolithic Behavior 
The equivalence of campaign contribution strategies is formally tested by transforming 
the dependent variable by the mean contribution within a subgroup to allow for comparisons, 
then jointly testing the equivalence of the Tobit model coefficients in a pairwise fashion using 
likelihood ratio tests.
2 More formally, the normalized contribution from subgroup j to legislator i 
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=∑ I A rejection of the null hypothesis that the coefficients 
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does not necessarily provide the source of the discrepancy. As such, visual inspection of the 
magnitude and significance of individual variables will be used to determine how the strategies 
differ. Due to space considerations, the normalized regressions are not reported here, but are 
available from authors upon request. 
Senate 
  Table 5 provides the results of these tests for the Total Ag PAC model and major 
subaggregates in the Senate. Table entries provide the probability that the null hypothesis of 
equal coefficients is true, based on a chi-squared (17) distribution, where stars denote statistical 
significance at the 1, 5, and 10% levels. When compared to the pooled model that presumes a 
consistent data-generating process for all subaggregates (column 2), only Ag Services/Products, 
Crop Production and Basic Processing, and Dairy cannot be distinguished from overall industry 
behavior, with these three apparently focusing on a strategy that includes donations to both 
majority leadership (power) and committee members’ (influence). However, it should be noted 
that the data comprising each subaggregate is a subset of the Total Agricultural PAC aggregate, 
and the multicollinearity that results from all variables being included in the analysis will tend to 
inflate standard errors, and decrease the power of the statistical test. In addition, these three 
sectors comprise just over half (51%) of all PAC donations in the sample for the Senate. 
  When comparing subgroups against each other, there is evidence to suggest that several 
groups of PACs act according to the same contribution strategy. For example, there is no 
statistical difference between Ag Services/Products and Crop Production and Basic Processing. 
These are the two largest major subaggregates in terms of dollar amounts, contributing just over 
$4.6 million, or 44% of all agricultural PAC donations, to Senate members. Their strategy can be 
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approval is a significant determinant of higher contributions, suggesting a strong policy stance 
link. In addition, the joint model suggests that chairs of relevant (sub)committees receive less 
money, all else equal, and thus power is not a strong targeted attribute. This similarity might be 
attributed to the close ties between these sectors in terms of trade (with the Ag Services/Products 
sector likely providing many inputs into the Crop Production sector), but as we shall see, there 
are differences within these sectors as well. On the other hand, Forestry and Forest Products and 
Tobacco can not be distinguished either, but tend to follow a strategy of donating to majority 
party members overall, while specifically targeting party leadership, members of the 
appropriations subcommittee, and tight election races. This implies a desire to see the majority 
party remain dominant rather than directly influencing individual pieces of legislation (except 
perhaps appropriations).  Overall, these PACs contributed about $2.3 million, or 22% of total 
giving, to sitting Senators, though any potential links between these two sectors beyond 
geography is not immediately clear.  
  Additional decomposition analysis on these major subaggregates was performed by 
testing the equivalence of strategies for the smaller subgroups of PACs that comprise the larger 
industry. These results are presented in table 6, and show that while there is more similarity 
between PACs that comprise a larger subgroup than between these larger subgroups themselves, 
a large degree of heterogeneity still exists within a major subaggregate. One exception is 
Forestry, in which Forestry and Forest Products and Paper and Pulp Mills and Paper 
Manufacturing target primarily Republican and AFBF-friendly Senators in close electoral races.  
Within commodity groups, there is a good deal of homogeneity, with Cotton, Vegetables, Fruits, 
and Tree Nuts, and Other Commodities focusing contributions on the appropriations 
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relative conservatives in highly agricultural states irregardless of majority leadership position. In 
the Agricultural Services/Products sector, all PAC groups target either one or both committees as 
well, with only Farm Machinery and Equipment and Florists and Nursery Services pursuing a 
party-based strategy, and little evidence of power as a determinant of donations. Finally, in the 
Food Processing and Sales sector, Food and Beverage Products and Services, Food and Kindred 
Products Manufacturing, and Food Wholesalers target primarily influence via seniority on the 
agricultural committee, while Wholesalers also donate to majority party leadership, despite being 
the only subaggregate in this sector that does not systematically contribute to Republicans in 
general (an insignificant coefficient on Party). Several subgroups, namely Food and Beverage 
Products and Services and Meat Processing and Products, tend to prefer giving to candidates in 
states with high non-farm employment. Meet Processing and Products follows a similar strategy 
but with an eye towards policy stance via the AFBF variable, and Food Wholesalers tend to 
target agricultural committee members.  
House of Representatives 
Tables 7 and 8 present the results of a similar analysis for the House. As can be seen in 
table 7, column 2, the null hypothesis of equivalence of strategy between major subaggregates 
and total agricultural PACs for this chamber is rejected in each case. Overall, there is more 
heterogeneity across major subaggregates, with only 2 of a possible 28 tests of equivalence not 
rejected at the 5% level, as opposed to 8 of 28 in the Senate. However, these two pairs, Crop 
Production and Basic Processing /Dairy and Forestry and Forest Products/Tobacco, were also not 
significantly different for the Senate regressions. The determinants of contributions differ 
slightly, however. In the first case, committee chairs are positively targeted in the House, and 
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membership on the appropriations subcommittee still plays a role. In the second case, the 
difference comes from a lack of strong targeting of power via party leadership, instead focusing 
on a party affiliation as a whole and influence via committee membership. 
Table 8 displays the likelihood ratio tests for the breakdown of subaggregates in the 
House. Again, there seems to be more heterogeneity of strategy in the House as compared to the 
Senate, with many more rejections of the null hypothesis of equivalence. Nevertheless, there are 
some similarities. For example, all of the components of Ag Services/Products contribute more 
to members of the agriculture committee, although the relative strength of the marginal effects 
and the channels by which they enter the model differs considerably. Potentially cooperative 
subsectors include Farm Orgs and Co-Ops and Ag Chemicals, and Farm Orgs and Co-Ops and 
Ag Services, perhaps as a result of close working relationships between these subsectors.  
On the other hand, the Crop Production and Basic Processing sector targets the 
agriculture committee in only 3 of 6 cases, but exhibits a positive correlation between 
contributions and agricultural employment in 5 of 6 categories (Crop Production excluded) with 
varying strengths.  There are relatively fewer differences within this sector, with similar 
strategies for Wheat/Corn/Soy/Grain, Cotton, and Other Commodities and Crop Production. 
Furthermore, the Grain crop and Veges/Fruits/Nuts subaggregates are significantly different only 
at the 10% level, suggesting, as in the Senate, some similarities in those sectors directly related 
to farm commodity production. The components of Food Processing and Sales PACs also 
identify very similar determinants with different magnitudes, including party affiliation and the 
agriculture committee, but with widely varying (normalized) coefficients (between 3.2 and 28 for 
party, for example). Finally, in the Forestry sector, Paper and Pulp Mills target Republicans 
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agricultural areas. 
Summary, Deductions, and Conclusions  
This paper extended the literature relating to the donation strategies of agricultural PACs 
by examining and testing a variety of variables theoretically related to contributions and formally 
testing for equivalence of donation strategies across PACs of varying levels of aggregation. We 
assume that each PAC seeks to maximize a latent, unobservable objective related to some 
combination of legislative outcomes and political access, and engages in rent-seeking behavior 
pursuing a strategy of its own choosing. Both chambers of the 108
th Congress were modeled, 
with particular attention paid to the targeting of different power and influence sources within the 
legislature, while also controlling for ideology, constituency, and the tightness of the electoral 
race.  
The results showed that there is significant heterogeneity between PAC subgroups in 
agriculture, and that this heterogeneity manifests itself across both industry subgroups and across 
chambers. In some cases, certain agricultural PACs tend to target according to party, either 
across the broad spectrum of legislators, or specifically to the majority leadership in power, as 
proposed by the conditional party government hypothesis. In other cases, especially in the 
House, committee assignments and chairs tend to attract larger donations, most likely due to the 
relative power over legislation important to the subindustry. In still other cases, a mixed strategy 
is pursued in which both majority leadership and committee leadership is targeted.  
The observation of considerable heterogeneity within- and between- subindustry 
strategies and objectives has implications that reach beyond the statistical findings about how 
each PAC seeks rents. As suggested in the introduction, our results provide insights about rent-
  17seeking behavior from PACs that are not easily observed.  First, our results inform how 
contributions are being used and how they might continue to be used as the legislature evolves, 
which in turn might be important for legislation for campaign-finance reform.  Whether it is 
spending limits, public financing, or public disclosure, reforms would likely affect subgroups 
with different strategies and goals in different ways, including reallocating political favors and 
access and thus affecting political rents. In a broad yet partially supported industry like 
agriculture, these impacts have the potential to be severe at both the subsector and individual 
level. 
Second, our finding that PACs deploy different strategies across the two chambers 
highlights the impact of the structure of favor-granting institutions on rent-seeking strategies. For 
example, it appears that the building polarization of political parties has a greater effect on 
donation strategies in the Senate than the House, perhaps due to the differences in how tightly 
each is organized, the ability of majority leaders to control legislation, and the marginal power of 
each legislator. However, as the institutions of government continue to evolve, and power 
becomes either more or less concentrated in committee leadership or majority leadership in each 
chamber, we would expect contribution strategies to adjust accordingly. In other words, our 
findings are a static snapshot of an underlying dynamic process. 
Third, and finally, we found that there is little evidence of cooperative behavior, which is 
at odds with conventional thinking that agricultural subsidies persist because of a romantic and 
mostly homogenous image of farms.  The degree of homogeneity, or lack thereof, between 
agricultural PAC groups begs the question of whether or not there could be gains from 
collaboration between subindustries, or if division of labor and other forms of diversification are 
indeed optimal. There is little doubt that ultimately, rent-seeking behavior influences policy, and 
  18that most effective policy decisions have definite welfare effects.   But has there been a sort of 
collective impact of rent seeking that helps “agriculture” overall, leaving it to the participants to 
divide the spoils based on their rent seeking efforts?   If so, there are two dimensions in rent 
seeking that must be accounted for, the cumulative impact and the individual impact.   
Differential goals and strategies in campaign finance can interact as either complements or 
substitutes in increasing (or decreasing) welfare between subsectors, and further research is 




1 See www.fb.org. 
2 For the Senate, the electoral year dummy variables were included in the regressions, but not 
tested for equivalence. 
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PAC Subgroup Total $ % of Total # Recipients Total $ % of Total # Recipients
TOTAL AG PACS 10,488,041 100% 94 12,227,277 100% 413
AG SERVICES/PRODUCTS 2,413,151 23% 90 2,483,328 20% 306
Ag Chemicals 507,056 5% 57 486,463 4% 133
Ag Services 558,538 5% 62 629,771 5% 172
Animal Feed and Health Products 251,250 2% 34 196,500 2% 46
Farm Machinery and Equipment 177,050 2% 39 259,500 2% 84
Farm Organizations and Co-ops 325,691 3% 60 519,924 4% 160
Florists and Nursery Services 109,666 1% 42 177,920 1% 82
Grain Traders and Terminals 175,650 2% 46 47,250 0% 29
Veterinarians 308,250 3% 72 166,000 1% 119
CROP PRODUCTION AND BASIC PROCESSING 2,149,378 20% 87 3,138,205 26% 310
Cotton 217,284 2% 44 365,938 3% 101
Crop Production 82,050 1% 27 130,000 1% 52
Other Commodities 354,500 3% 45 337,400 3% 71
Sugarcane and Sugarbeets 1,046,872 10% 72 1,741,667 14% 268
Vegetables, Fruits, and Tree Nuts 269,222 3% 52 385,200 3% 111
Wheat, Corn, Soybeans, and Cash Grain 179,450 2% 40 178,000 1% 83
DAIRY -- MILK AND DAIRY PRODUCERS 793,585 8% 88 1,313,366 11% 326
FOOD PROCESSING AND SALES 1,960,798 19% 87 1,618,611 13% 282
Food and Beverage Products and Services 188,857 2% 54 202,719 2% 118
Food and Kindered Products Manufacturing 963,457 9% 77 629,228 5% 182
Food Stores 521,582 5% 71 454,716 4% 153
Food Wholesalers 75,988 1% 33 82,000 1% 31
Meat Processing and Products 211,914 2% 53 249,948 2% 74
FORESTRY AND FOREST PRODUCTS 1,338,768 13% 71 1,115,279 9% 236
Forestry and Forest Products 928,292 9% 63 918,202 8% 222
Paper and Pulp Mills and Paper Manufacturing 410,476 4% 60 197,077 2% 89
LIVESTOCK 504,371 5% 68 478,045 4% 142
Feedlots and Related Livestock Services 41,500 0% 18 52,500 0% 22
Horse Breeders 7,000 0% 2 3,500 0% 4
Livestock 414,211 4% 66 413,295 3% 133
Sheep and Wool Producers 41,660 0% 25 8,750 0% 7
MISC AGRICULTURE 2,721 0% 3 0 0% 0
POULTRY AND EGGS 361,028 3% 56 509,359 4% 124
TOBACCO AND TOBACCO PRODUCTS 964,241 9% 57 1,571,084 13% 230
Senate House of Representatives
Table 1. Total PAC donations and number of recipients by chamber, 108th Congress
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Table 2. Independent variable summary statistics by chamber 
   House Senate
   Mean Std. Dev.  Mean Std. Dev.
Party and Ideology 
Party (1 if Republican)  0.53 0.50 0.51 0.50
AFBF (1 if "friend")  0.40 0.49 0.55 0.50





Influence     
   
   
   
Yrs in Office  11.11 7.80 13.72 10.16
Appropriations Ag Subcommittee (1 if member)  0.03 0.17 0.17 0.38






Majority Leadership (1 if leadership)  0.01 0.11 0.06 0.24











Tightness of Race 
Electoral Margin (%)  42.26 26.36  25.51 19.61


















Party 40,934 -7,450 25,439 20,477 9,003 17,967
(2.47)** (1.44) (7.00)*** (4.71)*** (7.81)*** (3.81)***
AFBF 50,369 13,207 11,643 6,013 11,367 5,701 9,674
(3.09)*** (3.05)*** (2.22)** (1.67)* (2.74)*** (3.70)*** (2.06)**





Yrs in Off. 413 301
(1.82)* (1.22)
(Yrs in Off.)^2 -9 -15
(1.66)* (2.21)**
Ag. Com. 52,571 21,915 33,261 7,505
(2.28)** (3.19)*** (5.36)*** (4.61)***
App. Ag Sub. 70,695 27,054 32,646 7,228 -11,121 4,260
(3.89)*** (4.84)*** (5.45)*** (3.83)*** (1.54) (3.04)***
Yrs in Off*Ag Com. 4,475 1,809 1,078 278 602
(3.55)*** (4.79)*** (5.37)*** (4.00)*** (5.82)***
Yrs in Off*App. Sub. 837 326
(2.04)** (2.77)***
Power
Maj Lead 51,192 13,705 14,515 14,130
(1.72)* (1.93)* (2.76)*** (1.93)*
Com/Sub Chair -42,300
(4.04)***
Yrs in Off*Maj Lead. 1,364 -1,325
(1.62) (1.93)*
Yrs in Off*Chair 1,971
(3.66)***
Constituency
State Ag Emp -1,166 1,299 666 -792
(1.62) (1.59) (2.56)** (2.15)**
Tightness of Race
Margin 187 -273 -310 -51 -220
(1.71)* (3.32)*** (3.17)*** (1.71)* (2.29)**
Constant 9,823 -5,845 5,303 1,332 7,848 -4,542 -12,774 -16,158 -150,106
(0.84) (1.28) (1.40) (0.69) (2.35)** (1.10) (3.16)*** (2.91)*** (2.92)***
Observations 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses. Zero coefficient restrictions imposed based on likelihood ratio tests (5%).
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Table 3. Restricted non-normalized Tobit regression results, U.S. Senate, 108th Congress
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PACs
Ag 















Party 16,096 6,384 6,409 7,410 4,620 8,253
(5.16)*** (5.97)*** (6.67)*** (8.31)*** (6.71)*** (8.09)***
AFBF 1,696 2,123
(3.30)*** (3.02)***
Id Diff. -1,334 -542 -218 44 128 188 132 -556
(1.69)* (2.10)** -0.73 (2.44)** (3.70)*** (6.29)*** (5.54)*** (2.50)**
(Id Diff.)^2 10 4 2 4
(2.54)** (2.84)*** -1.51 (3.33)***
Influence
Yrs in Off. -1,628 -364 -559 -232 -348 -383
(2.79)*** (1.88)* (2.70)*** (2.57)** (2.02)** (2.18)**
(Yrs in Off.)^2 45 12 17 8 9 11
(2.61)*** (2.08)** (2.78)*** (2.94)*** (1.78)* (2.07)**
Ag. Com. 3,075 6,366 2,561
(2.42)** (4.56)*** (1.63)
App. Ag Sub. 74,591 19,150 18,938 7,587 16,776 9,350 11,933 5,191
(8.25)*** (6.62)*** (5.95)*** (5.50)*** (6.54)*** (6.80)*** (7.59)*** (1.93)*
Yrs in Off*Ag Com. 7,224 2,472 2,078 796 1,051 468 408
(11.16)*** (11.98)*** (9.05)*** (8.25)*** (5.66)*** (4.67)*** (2.58)**
Power
Maj Lead 15,512 8,621 6,537
(2.82)*** (2.10)** (1.65)*
Com/Sub Chair 49,466 11,472 13,917 11,062 6,814 3,468 4,811
(4.85)*** (3.50)*** (3.94)*** (3.86)*** (4.15)*** (1.90)* (1.66)*
Yrs in Off*Maj Lead. 3,795 1,549 -657 433 436
(3.65)*** (4.70)*** (1.67)* (2.86)*** (2.45)**
Yrs in Off*Chair 253
(2.43)**
Constituency
District Ag Emp 1,058 434 -415 345 242




Constant 50,891 15,848 2,189 -3,744 -13,994 -24,987 -18,328 -6,031 13,526
(1.26) (1.20) (0.14) (1.95)* (3.71)*** (7.75)*** (6.73)*** (8.73)*** (1.19)
Observations 435 435 435 435 435 435 435 435 435
Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses. Zero coefficient restrictions imposed based on likelihood ratio tests (5%).
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Table 4. Restricted non-normalized Tobit regression results, U.S. House of Representatives, 108th Congress
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Table 5. Likelihood ratio tests of joint equivalence of normalized Tobit coefficients by major subaggregate



















Crop Production & Basic 
Processing 0.123 0.457
Dairy 0.594 0.090* 0.587
Food Processing & Sales 0.092* 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.002***
Forestry and Forest Products 0.001*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.113
Livestock 0.025** 0.001*** 0.000*** 0.001*** 0.027** 0.120
Poultry and Eggs 0.006*** 0.011** 0.001*** 0.000*** 0.002*** 0.003*** 0.008***
Tobacco 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.007*** 0.346 0.063* 0.072*
Table values indicate Pr (Null hypothesis of joint equiv
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** signific
 
 
alency is not rejected)
ant at 1%  28
 
 
Table 6. Likelihood ratio tests of joint equivalence of normalized Tobit coefficients by minor subaggregate
U.S. Senate, 108th Congress
AG SERV/PROD Ag Chem Ag Serv An Feed & Health Farm Mach & Equip Farm Org & Co-op Florists/Nursery Grain Trade/Term
Ag Chem 0.105
Ag Serv 0.661 0.546
An Feed & Health 0.000*** 0.001*** 0.000***
Farm Mach & Equip 0.003*** 0.355 0.076** 0.005***
Farm Org & Co-op 0.625 0.688 0.698 0.000*** 0.088*
Florists/Nursery 0.000*** 0.031** 0.017** 0.000*** 0.909 0.022**
Grain Trade/Term 0.224 0.439 0.423 0.001*** 0.085* 0.592 0.033**
Vets 0.113 0.008*** 0.015** 0.000*** 0.006*** 0.232 0.011** 0.231
CROP PROD/PROC Cotton Crop Prod Other Com Sugar Veges/Fruits/Nuts
Cotton 0.004***
Crop Prod 0.000*** 0.049**
Other Com 0.013** 0.986 0.012**
Sugar 0.400 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.008***
Veges/Fruits/Nuts 0.442 0.388 0.006*** 0.254 0.093*
Wheat/Corn/Soy/Grain 0.001*** 0.084* 0.097** 0.219 0.002*** 0.300
FOOD PROC & SALES Food & Bev Food /Prod Man Food Stores Food Whole
Food & Bev 0.357
Food /Prod Man 0.964 0.116
Food Stores 0.956 0.296 0.683
Food Whole 0.000*** 0.005*** 0.000*** 0.001***
Meat Proc& Prod 0.001*** 0.047** 0.007*** 0.031** 0.012**
FORESTRY Forest Prod
Forest Prod 1.000
Paper and Pulp 0.608 0.249
Table values indicate Pr (Null hypothesis of joint equivalency is not rejected)
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%  29
Table 7. Likelihood ratio tests of joint equivalence of normalized Tobit coefficients by major subaggregate
U.S. House of Representatives, 108th Congress
Total Ag 
PACs















Crop Production & Basic Processing 0.005*** 0.000***
Dairy 0.062** 0.000*** 0.413
Food Processing & Sales 0.000*** 0.013** 0.000*** 0.000***
Forestry and Forest Products 0.000*** 0.000***
Livestock 0.000*** 0.000*** ***
Poultry and Eggs 0.000*** 0.000*** *** 0.020**
Tobacco 0.000*** 0.000*** 77 0.000*** 0.000***
Table values indicate Pr (Null hypothesis of joint equivalency is 






0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000
0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000
0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.5
not rejected)Table 8. Likelihood ratio tests of joint equivalence of normalized Tobit coefficients by minor subaggregate
U.S. House of Representatives, 108th Congress
AG SERV/PROD Ag Chem Ag Serv An Feed & Health Farm Mach & Equip Farm Org & Co-op Florists/Nursery Grain Trade/Term
Ag Chem 0.000***
Ag Serv 0.000*** 0.002***
An Feed & Health 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000***
Farm Mach & Equip 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000***
Farm Org & Co-op 0.000*** 0.086* 0.476 0.000*** 0.000***
Florists/Nursery 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.015** 0.000***
Grain Trade/Term 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.048** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000***
Vets 0.000*** 0.017** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000***
CROP PROD/PROC Cotton Crop Prod Other Com Sugar Veges/Fruits/Nuts
Cotton 0.000***
Crop Prod 0.000*** 0.006***
Other Com 0.000*** 0.059** 0.290
Sugar 0.255 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000***
Veges/Fruits/Nuts 0.000*** 0.050** 0.003*** 0.002*** 0.000***
Wheat/Corn/Soy/Grain 0.000*** 0.299 0.201 0.034** 0.000*** 0.074*
FOOD PROC & SALES Food & Bev Food /Prod Man Food Stores
Food & Bev 0.000***
Food /Prod Man 0.335 0.001***
Food Stores 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.097*
Meat Proc& Prod 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000***
FORESTRY Forest Prod
Forest Prod 1.000
Paper and Pulp 0.000*** 0.000***
Table values indicate Pr (Null hypothesis of joint equivalency is not rejected)
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Food wholesale sector excluded due to extreme censoring/collinearity in estimation.  
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